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ABSTRACT Cyber-Physical-Social System (CPSS) provides users secure and high-quality mobile service
applications to share and exchange data in the cyberspace and physical world. With the explosive growth
of data, it is necessary to introduce cloud storage service, which allows devices frequently resort to the
cloud for data storage and sharing, into CPSS. In this paper, we propose a data storage and sharing scheme
for CPSS with the help of cloud storage service. Since data integrity assurance is an inevitable problem in
cloud storage, we first design a secure and efficient data storage scheme based on the technology of public
auditing and bilinear map, which also ensures the security of the verification. In order to meet the real-time
and reliability requirements of the CPSS, the rewards of timeliness incentive and effectiveness incentive
are considered in the scheme. Secondly, based on the proposed storage scheme and ElGamal encryption,
we propose a lightweight access model for users to access the final data processed by cloud server. We
formally prove the security of the proposed scheme, and conduct performance evaluation to validate its high
efficiency. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme has lower overheads in communication
and access as compared to the technique CDS.
INDEX TERMS Data sharing, integrity checking, access control, cyber-physical-social systems, cloud
computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical-Social Systems (CPSS) [1] integrate the
cyber, physical and social spaces together to provide users
with a convenient and intelligent environment [2], [3]. The
CPSS allow a large number of social users to have more inter-
action than before by data sharing and exchanging, which
results in the explosive growth of the data generated and
collected from social and physical spaces [4]. Generally, these
data has the properties of 4Vs: volume, variety, velocity, and
veracity [5]. Therefore, how to store amd process the data
generated in CPSS becomes a key issue.
Cloud storage service makes it convenient for the devices
to frequently store and share the outsourced data, which
makes up for the defects of CPSS but alsowould bring a series
of security challenges inevitably [6]. Firstly, the integrity
of the outsourced files should be guarenteed since the data
stored in the cloudmay be corrupted due to hardware failures,
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manual operation errors, or external attack. Beside integrity
checking, the efficient is also a research point should be
concerned, sowe introduce the technique of public auditing to
ensure the integrity of outsourced data. Better than the tradi-
tional integrity checking scheme, public auditing makes the
verifier to check the integrity without downloading all files
with the help of a challenge-and-response protocol which can
realize sampling inspection with a high detection rate.What’s
more, the integrity checking by a third public party greatly
reduces the burden of file owners on computation resource
and it is on-line all the time. Last but not least, privacy pro-
tection cannot be ignored in public auditing since the public
verifiers are curious about the data privacy during this veri-
fication [7]. As we introduce cloud storage service in CPSS,
the above requirements such as integrity checking, efficiency
and privacy protection should all be satisfied in this paper.
To further improve the performance of data collection in
CPSS, the incentive mechanism to provide efficient crowd
sourcing becomes a challenge. The crowd sourcing plays an
important role as it encourages social users to provide data to
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the CPSS rather than only receive data from others [8]. The
various data collected by users in the CPSS can be further
processed for sensing, monitoring, and communicating with
the cyberspace and physical world [9]. For example, when a
newmobile user joins the crowd sourcing in the CPSS, he/she
can utilize the sensors equipped in his/her mobile sevice to
provide the information around. These information contains
traffic, weather, event information and so on. The CPSS can
collect these information to monitor the environment and
further process it to generate the final data for users to access.
In this paper, we set two kinds of incentive: the timeliness
reward and effectiveness reward to encourage users to join
the data collection. The setting also ensures the real-time [10],
[11] and reliability [12] in CPSS.
The property of lightweight is another important issue,
so the access method should be low-overhead [2]. To realize
lightweight, the attribute can be transformed to a numeric
parameter by weighted attribute [13]. The confidentiality
and availability are ensured by access control to prevent
unauthored users from file obtaining [13]. We use weighted
attribute [14] to optimize the access structure and ElGamal
encryption [15] to protect the security of the access key while
reduce the overhead of access respectively.
In this paper, we aim to design an efficient and secure
data storage and sharing scheme for Cyber-Physical-Social
Systems. In our scheme, users are encouraged to take part in
the data collection with rewards, such that the timeliness and
effectiveness can be realized. The privacy of the stored data
is preserved by using the pseudo-random method during the
integrity verification of files stored in the cloud and the pro-
posed access method meets the requirement of lightweight.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
1) We propose an secure and efficient data storage scheme
for CPSS based on the technology of public auditing.
The proposed data storage scheme can achieve secure
and efficient auditing since it utilizes pseudo-random
permutation and pseudo-random function to generate
the challenge message.
2) To meet the requirements of CPSS such as real-time
and reliability, we set two kinds of incentive value:
the timeliness incentive and effectiveness incentive in
this paper to encourage users to take part in the data
collection.
3) We deploy an efficient access method based on ElGa-
mal encryption in this paper, which significantly
reduces the overhead of file access for users. The
improved method meets the lightweight requirements.
4) We analyze the security in this paper and carry out
extensive experiments to evaluate the performance
of the proposed scheme in reducing the over-
head of computation and communication. Simula-
tion results demonstrate that the proposed scheme
outperforms the compared scheme: Customized Data
Sharing Scheme Based on Blockchain and Weighted
Attribute (CDS) in access.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. The related work about the proposed scheme is
summarized in Section II. Section III lists some prelimi-
naries for understanding the proposed scheme easily. The
design goals and models are described in Section IV. The
details of the data storage and sharing scheme are shown in
Section V. The analysis of the proposed scheme is presented
in Section VI and Section VII shows the experimental results.
Finally, we conclude this paper and list some future work in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
As the dishonest behavior of the cloud server and the
occurrence of software errors threaten the data integrity,
Ateniese et al. [16] proposed the definition of provable data
possession, which is the base of integrity checking schemes.
Zhang et al. [17] utilized public auditing by delegating the
auditing task to a third party to handle the problem of users’
limited computation source. Public auditing schemes must
pay attention to the leakage of data privacy [5] as the public
verifier is naturally curious about the sensitive information on
the files and will attempt to get private information from the
received message. To solve the problem, Yu et al. [18] intro-
duced ‘‘zero-knowledge privacy" to realize privacy protection
by ensuring that the verifier cannot learn any knowledge
about the stored data during the efficient auditing process.
However, the above public auditing methods are not efficient
due to their high communication and computation cost. In this
paper, we utilize ElGamal encryption [15] to achieve privacy
protection with efficiency.
In data sharing schemes, the free sharing may attack the
enthusiasm of users and result in the low motivation of
crowd sensing [9]. The concept of incentive was introduced
in public auditing schemes by Wang et al. [19] to encour-
age users to disclose bad issues. An incentive data sharing
scheme CDS [14] utilized the technology of blockchain to
encourage users to share data and support customization
based on attribute-based encryption (ABE) [20]. Su et al. [8]
designed an optimal method by dividing social users into
three types to select social users to join crowd sourcing
in CPSS.
The important cryptography primitive in access control
is ABE. Different from the fuzzy identity-based encryp-
tion (IBE) [21], the basic technology, ABE provides a one-to-
many file sharing by setting a access structure which limits
the visitors. As traditional ABE scheme [20] cannot sup-
port attribute with an arbitrary state, scheme [13] introduced
weighted ABE to show the importance of different attributes
in the same set. The conception of weighted attribute opti-
mizes the access structure and reduces overhead by storing
attribute values instead of attribute strings.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Before detailing the proposed scheme, we introduce the tech-
nology of ElGamal encryption and Bilinear map, which are
used in this paper.
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A. ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION
In this paper, the security and availability of the proposed
scheme is based on ElGamal encryption. T. ElGamal [15]
proposed a digital signature method ElGamal in 1985. The
method is based on the public key cryptosystem of discrete
logarithm problem in finite field. An ElGamal encryption has
the following steps.
1) Select a prime p, a prime field Zp = {1, 2, · · · , p− 1}
and a generator of Zp as g.
2) Choose a random number x ∈ [1, p − 1] to calculate
y = gx (mod p).
3) Choose a random number k ∈ [1, p − 1] to encrypt
message m as C = (C1,C2) where C1 = gk (mod p)
and C2 = myk (mod p).
4) Decrypt C = (C1,C2) by computing m = C2(Cx1 )
−1
(mod p).
The secret key is x and the public key is {y, g, p}. It’s hard
to calculate the secret key x with the public information
{y, g, p} [22]. Therefore, we use the asymmetric encryption
ElGamal encryption to enable secure key transfer.
B. BILINEAR MAP AND SECURITY ASSUMPTION
The integrity checking of stored files is based on the
properties of bilinear map and the security proof is under
Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in random oracle
model.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Map [23]): Let G1 and G2 be two
multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, and g be a
generator of groupG1. Then a bilinear map is e : G1×G1→
G2, which has the following properties.
1) For any elements x, y ∈ G1 and any primes a, b ∈ Zq,
the equation e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab holds, where Zq is
the set of prime numbers.
2) For any elements x1, x2, v ∈ G1, the equation e(x1 ·
x2, v) = e(x1, v) · e(x2, v) holds.
3) There must be a method to calculate the value of map
e efficiently, which is non-trivial as e(g, g) 6= 1.
C. HOMOMORPHIC AUTHENTICATION
Homomorphic authentication is the basis for integrity check-
ing by enabling an auditor to verify the integrity of a file
without downloading the full file. It has three properties:
unforgeability, blockless verification and non-malleability.
• Unforgeability: a party without the correct private key is
unable to generate a valid message.
• Blockless verification: an auditor verifies the correct-
ness of file with a linear combination of blocks without
knowing the details of the file.
• Non-malleability: a party without the valid secret keys
cannot use the given signatures to generate a valid sig-
nature on the combined blocks.
IV. DESIGN GOALS AND SYSTEM MODELS
In this section, we talk about the design goals and system
models of the proposed data storage and sharing method.
A. DESIGN GOALS
The proposed method has the properties as follows.
1) Integrity. The proposed scheme allows each user to collect
data and store it in the cloud server who is asked to prove
the integrity of the stored data due to same software errors.
2) Efficiency and security. What’s more, the communica-
tion overhead is low and the integrity checking is secure
against the public verifier in the proposed scheme. 3) Unique
access. For the contribution of data owners, they are rewarded
with value of timeliness incentive and effectiveness incentive
which is used to get the access of the final processed file.
The access is also lightweighted. To meet the requirements
of CPSS, we propose a lightweighted file access method.
B. SYSTEM MODELS
The proposed system in this paper consists of three models:
the data storage model, the public verification model and the
access model. In the data storage model, each user collects
the data, signs the data and uploads it with its signature
to the cloud server. Once receives the message from the
users, the cloud server timestamps the data and stores the set
of the data information. The user is allowed to check the
integrity of the stored data information with the help of the
public verification model. Themajor technology of the public
verification model is a challenge-and-responce protocol. The
access model gives the users who meet the requirement of
access threshold the rights to access the final data. The details
of these three models are as follows.
1) DATA STORAGE MODEL
The data storage model helps users to generate signature on
their collected data and further be used to check data integrity.
After getting the data from users, the cloud server timestamps
it to store. As shown in Fig. 1, the data storage model is
composed of three entities: 1) CA, a certificate authority (CA)
who generates key pairs and the public parameters; 2) users,
who collect data, sign it and store it in the cloud server;
3) the cloud server, which has sufficient storage capacity and
computation resources to process files.
FIGURE 1. The model of data store.
CA first runs algorithm Setup to generates the public
parameters for the system. Then, the user runs algorithm
KeyGen to get the key pair and further use algorithm Sign to
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generate the signature of the collected data. Finally, the data
and its signature are timestamped by the cloud server by
algorithm Store before storing.
2) PUBLIC VERIFICATION MODEL
As shown in Fig. 2, the public verification model is composed
of three entities: 1) users, who have a large quantity of collect
files to be stored in the cloud or have the right to download
these files; 2) a public verifier, who is delegated by the
honest-but-curious user to verify the integrity of stored data
by a challenge-and-response protocol, since he/she may be
curious about the data information; 3) the cloud server, which
has sufficient storage capacity and computation resources to
process files but may inadvertently modify or delete the orig-
inal stored data due to hardware failures or manual operation
errors. To maintain its reputation, the cloud may conceal the
fact that the data is damaged [5]. Therefore, the cloud is not
fully trusted and should be checked.
FIGURE 2. The public verification model.
Public verification can greatly reduce users’ burden on
checking the integrity of the stored data and also protects
data privacy during the checking. In general, public auditing
operates as follows. Firstly, a user sends a checking request
to the public verifier, which immediately sends an auditing
challenge message to the cloud server by running ChalGen
once receiving the request. Based on the stored data, the cloud
server will reply an auditing proof of data possession to the
public verifier after receiving the challenge with the help of
ProofGen. Finally, the public verifier runsProofVer to verify
the correctness of the proof and then returns the result back
to the user.
3) ACCESS MODEL
After data collection, the cloud server will process the data
collected by all users to generate the final shared data. For
encouragement, each user who contributes the final data will
get incentive and the incentive value is set by the cloud server
according to the value of the collected data. Noting that there
are two kinds of incentive: the timeliness incentive given in
Store and effectiveness of the collect data in this part. The
access model is composed of two entities: user and the cloud
server.
In data access, as shown in Fig. 3, the cloud server first sets
the paramaters including the access threshold and the weights
of two kinds of incentive throughVSet. Then, the cloud server
runs ASet to encrypt the availability incentive of the user.
With the help of GetA, the user gets the attribute values with
the secret key. Finally, the user accesses the final data with
the help of algorithm Access if the value of his/her attribute
set is bigger than the access threshold.
FIGURE 3. The proposed access model.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed data storage and sharing scheme consists of
three parts: data collection, data checking and data access.
In data collection, each member collects information and
signs the informationwith his/her secret key before uploading
the pair of information and the corresponding signature to the
cloud server. After getting the message from a user, the cloud
server sets the values of each data according to the timeliness
and effectiveness of the data and encrypts the values with the
public key of the data owner. To ensure the collected data is
correctly stored in the cloud, the data owner is allowed to
check the integrity of the stored data. With the secret key,
the data owner is able to get the encrypted value and accesses
the final data if the value meets the access conditions in data
access. The details of data prosessing are not considered in
this paper.
To describe the proposed scheme clearly, we show the
meanings of the notations in TABLE 1 first.
A. THE DETAILS OF DATA COLLECTION
Every user is able to collect data for data processing. The
details of data collection consist of four algorithms: Setup,
KeyGen, Sign and Store.
Setup: This algorithm is run by CA to generate the public
system parameter set (g,G1,G2, q,H , f , π). Given a secret
parameter s, this algorithm chooses two multiplicative cycle
groups G1 and G2 of prime order q respectively where q is
a large prime number. Then it selects a generator g from the
multiplicative cycle groups G1, a hash fuction H : Zq →
G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Choose a
pseudo-random function f as f : Zq × {1, 2, · · · , n} → Zq
and a pseudo-random permutation π : Zq × {1, 2, · · · , n} →
{1, 2, · · · , n}, respectively. Finally, it outputs the public
parameter set (g,G1,G2, q,H , f , π).
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TABLE 1. Meaning of Notations.
KeyGen: The user ua with identity IDa runs this algorithm
to generate his/her key pairs as (uska, upka). The user selects
a random number xa ∈ Zq as his/her secret key uska = xa and
calculates his/her public key as upka = gxa ∈ G1.
Sign: This algorithm is run by a data owner ua to generate
the signature σi of data mi with file block tag FIDi before
uploading. With the user secret key uska, the data messagemi
and its identity FIDi, the signature σi is calculated as σi =
(H (FIDi) · gmi )uska ∈ G1. Finally, the user uploads the set
Sa,i = {upka,FIDi,mi, σi} to the cloud server.
Store: The cloud server runs this algorithm to store the
message. After getting the set Sa,i = {upka,FIDi,mi, σi},
the cloud server adds a timestamp to the set and
stores the message collected by user ua as S ′a,i =
{upka,FIDi,mi, σi,Ta,i}, where the timestamp Ta,i is used
to incentive user ua.
B. THE DETAILS OF DATA CHECKING
In data checking, the data owner checks the integrity of the
collected files of user ua by a challenge-and-response proto-
col with the help of a public verifier through three algorithms:
ChalGen, ProfGen and ProfVer. For ease of description,
we assume the files collected by user ua as F = {mi}1≤i≤n,
where n is a large number and denotes the number of the file
blocks mi.
ChalGen: After getting the verify request from the data
owner ua, the public verifier generates the challenge message
chal = {c, k1, k2} in this algorithm. The public verifier gener-
ates a random set named challengemessage chal = (c, k1, k2)
by choosing two random numbers k1, k2 ∈ Zq and the number
of challenge file blocks c.
ProofGen: Once receivng the challenge message from the
public verifier, the cloud server generates the proof mes-
sage Pro = {{FIDι}ι∈I , µ, ϕ} in this algorithm. With the
challenge message chal = (c, k1, k2), 1 ≤ c ≤ n, based
on the information of the stored set of user ua as S ′a,i =
{upka,FIDi,mi, σi,Ta,i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the cloud server first
computes ι = πk1 (j) ∈ [1, n], vι = fk2 (j) ∈ Zq for each
j ∈ [1, c]. Then, the cloud server aggregates the block tags
as ϕ = 5ι∈Iσ
vι
ι ∈ G1 where I is the set of ι. The cloud
server also needs to calculate µ =
∑
ι∈I vιmι (mod p − 1),
and sends audit proof Pro = {{FIDι}ι∈I , µ, ϕ} to the public
verifier.
ProofVer: With the proof message, the public verifier is
able to verifiy the file integrity with the help of this algorithm.
The public verifier computes
ι = πk1 (j), vι = fk2 (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ c
and then checks the proof by
e(ϕ, g) = e(5ι∈IH (FIDι)vι · gµ, upka). (1)
If (1) holds, the file F stored in the cloud is deemed as valid
and the public verifier returns the result ‘0’ to the cloud server.
C. THE DETAILS OF DATA ACCESS
After data collection, the cloud server will process the data to
generate the final shared data and each user who contributes
to the final data will get incentive. The incentive is reflected
in two aspects: the timeliness and effectiveness of the collect
data. The details of data processing is ignored in this paper,
so we just regard the timeliness and the availability of the
stored data set S ′a,i as Ta,i and Aa,i respectively. Noting that
the owner of the set is user ua and he/she is able to decrypt
the encrypted availability incentive Enupka (Aa,i) with his/her
secret key as the cloud server encrypts the incentive value
with the public key of user ua.
In data access, the cloud server first sets the paramaters
including the access threshold and the weights of two kinds
of incentive through VSet. Then, in ASet, the cloud server
encrypts the availability incentive of the user. The user ua
gets the attribute values by algorithm GetA. When the value
of his/her attribute set is larger than the access threshold,
the user is allowed to access the final data with the help of
algorithm Access. Otherwise, the user needs to buy some
attribute values to reach the access threshold.
VSet: The cloud server runs this algorithm to generate the
set {atFD,wTIFD ,wAIFD}. According to all availability incen-
tive of file FD, the cloud server sets the access threshold as
atFD, the weight of the timeliness incentive wTIFD and the
weight of the availability incentive wAIFD .
ASet: This algorithm is run by the cloud server to encrypts
the availability incentive of the user. Given the availability
incentive set of user ua as {Aa,i}i∈[1,n], the cloud server links
all values Aa,i in file order to form attribute chain values as
Aa = a1||a2|| · · · ||an. The cloud server selects a random
number r ∈ Zq to calculate C1 = gr ∈ G1 and C2 = upkra ·
Aa. Finally, the cloud server sends the encrypted availability
incentive (C1,C2) to user ua.
GetA:With the user key pair (uska, upka) of user ua and the
encrypted availability incentive Enupka (Aa) = (C1,C2),
the user first decrypts it as Aa = C2 · (C
uska
1 )
−1 to further get
the availability incentive Aa,i. The user ua gets the timeliness
incentive Ta,i by accessing the stored data set. Finally, the user
ua gets the value of the attribute set ASi = (TIi,AIi) as
asa,i = (Ta,i,Aa,i)
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Access: User ua runs this algorithm to access the final
data FD with access key akFD. With the help of algorithm
GetA, the user ua gets all the value of the attribute set as
asa = {asa,i}i∈[1,n]. Assume that the weight of the timeliness
incentive and the availability incentive of the final dataFD are
wTIFD and wAIFD respectively, the access threshold is atFD and
the value set asa = {asa,i}i∈[1,n], the cloud server calculates





If ava is not less than the access threshold atFD, the cloud
server gives the access key akFD to user ua.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section provides a detailed analysis on the security of
the proposed scheme from four perspectives: homomorphic
authentication and integrity to ensure public auditing, data
privacy against public verifiers, and availability for access.
Theorem 1 (Homomorphic Authentication): The proposed
scheme supports homomorphic authentication.
Proof: Homomorphic authenticationmeets the demands
of blockless verifiability and non-malleability, which is the
basic tool to construct public verification mechanism. There-
fore, we need to prove that the proposed scheme supports
blockless verifiability and non-malleability [24]. Given two
blocksm1 andm2 with the user public key upk , the identifiers
FID1 and FID2, the signatures σ1 and σ2, and two random
numbers y1 and y2, a verifier is required to check the correct-






















It’s clear that the checking does not need to know in advance
the value of blocks m1 and m2. Based on the properties of
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Therefore, the proposed scheme supports blockless verifi-
cation. We then prove the second property that an attacker
without knowing the private key cannot generate a valid
signature σ ′ for the combined block m′ = y1m1 + y2m2 by
combining σ1 and σ2 with y1 and y2. As hash function H is a
one-way hash function, it’s impossible for the attacker to suc-
cess. Let θ = [H (FID′)gm
′
]α denote the correct signature of








α , if θ can




H (FID′), which contradicts to the assumption that H is a
one-way hash function.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is a homomorphic authen-
ticable scheme. 
Theorem 2 (Integrity): The cloud server is able to pass the
integrity verification if it indeed stores the right files and
follows the challenge-and-response protocol to generate the
proof message honestly.
Proof: In algorithm ProofGen, after receiving the chal-
lenge message chall = (c, k1, k2), 1 ≤ c ≤ n, the cloud
server first computes ι = πk1 (j) ∈ [1, n], vι = fk2 (j) ∈
Zq for each j ∈ [1, c] based on the challenge message.
With the information of the stored set of user ua as S ′a,i =
{upka,FIDi,mi, σi,Ta,i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the cloud server calcu-
lates the block tags as ϕ = 5ι∈Iσ
vι
ι ∈ G1 where I is the set
of ι to generate the proof message Pro = {{FIDι}ι∈I , µ, ϕ}.
Then, based on the property of bilinear map in Section 1 we
have (4) as follows.
e(ϕ, g) = e(5ι∈Iσ vιι , g)
= e(5ι∈I ((H (FIDι) · gmι )uska )vι , g)
= e(5ι∈I (H (FIDι) · gmι )vι , guska )
= e(5ι∈IH (FIDι)vι · g
∑
ι∈I vιmι , upka)
= e(5ι∈IH (FIDι)vι · gµ, upka). (4)
Therefore, the integrity of the stored file is guaranteed
when the cloud server indeed stores the correct file signature
and follows the protocol. 
Theorem 3 (Data Privacy): A public verifier cannot learn
any knowledge of the challenged blocks during the verifica-
tion of data integrity.
Proof: During the integrity checking, the public auditor
sends challenge message chall = (c, k1, k2), 1 ≤ c ≤ n
to the cloud server to obtain the proof message Pro =
{{FIDι}ι∈I , µ, ϕ}. If the public verifier gets two combined
message µ =
∑
i∈I vimi by pre-designing, the verifier can
get the content of data by collecting a sufficient number
of linear combinations of message signatures and solving
the resultant linear equations [25]. For example, in the first
checking task, the public verifier asks the cloud server to
generate the proofmessage p1 = vimi, i ∈ [1, c] with random
number set as {v1, v2, . . . , vi, . . . , vc} selected by the verifier.
Then, the verifier initiates the second validation with random
number set as {v1, v2, . . . , v′i, . . . , vc} by chanding an element
of I to challenge the same file message. Finally, the verifier
gets two proofmessages as p1 = v1m1+· · ·+vimi+· · ·+vcmc
and p2 = v1m1 + · · · + v′imi + · · · + vcmc. Therefore,
the verifier has the ability to compute the file message as
mi = (p2 − p1)/(v′i − vi). To avoid the above problem of
message leakage, we use a pseudo-random permutation and a
pseudo-random function to genearte the message of challeng
information to avoid the above situation. In this paper, if the
public verifier wants to solve bilinear equations, he/she has
to change an element of {vi}i∈I generated by ι = πk1 (j), vι =
fk2 (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ c. However, whether he/she changes the
value of k1 or k2, the verifier cannot change only one element
of {vι}ι∈I . In other words, the attacker cannot get the m by
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solving a set of linear equations. In this manner, the proposed
schem protects data privacy in the integrity checking. 
Theorem 4 (Availabilty): The user is able to obtain the
incentive value in the proposed scheme.
Proof: In algorithm ASet, the cloud server forms
attribute chain values of user ua as Aa = a1||a2|| · · · ||an
based on the the availability incentive set of user ua. Then the
cloud server calculatesC1 = gr ∈ G1 andC2 = upkra ·Aa and
sends the encrypted availability incentive (C1,C2) to user ua.
With the encrypted availability incentive (C1,C2), user ua is
able to use his/her secrect key to decrypt it to get the value of
the attribute set Aa. With the user key pair (uska, upka) of user
ua, based on the property of ElGamal encryption in Section III












Therefore, user ua is allowed to get the attribute set to
further access the file. 
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce some knowledge of perfor-
mance evaluation. Then, we analyze the communication and
computation costs of the proposed scheme, and also evaluate
the performance in experiments.
A. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
On the deployment of experiments, we adopted the Pairing
Based Cryptography (PBC) [26] library to simulate the cryp-
tographic operations in our proposed scheme. All the exper-
iments are tested on an Intel Core i7 processor of 3.40 GHz,
and the Ubuntu operating system. Without loss of generality,
we test our scheme over 1,000 times.
Before detailing the performance evaluation, it’s necessary
to find out the relationship between the number of chal-
lenging blocks and the probability of corruption detection.
In each verification task, the public verifier challenges c
blocks and the cloud server responds the challenge message
by generating a proof message of data possession. The value
of c is very important because it determines the computaion
overhead, communication overhead and the success rate of
verification.
Suppose that a file F contains n blocks, where l blocks
have been corrupted. The public verifier challenges c blocks
to check the integrity of file F . The probability of finding
one or more corrupted blocks is PX , where X denotes the
number of invalid blocks being challenged. Then we have





n− l − 1
n− 1
× · · ·









)c ≤ PX ≤ (
n− l − c+ 1
n− c+ 1
)c.
In this paper, we set the number of file blocks n as
1000 andwe also show the relationship between l, the number
of corrupted blocks and PX , the probability of corruption
detection when the number of challenged blocks c is 40 and
50 respectively in Fig. 4. The horizontal coordinates represent
the number of corrupted blocks l and the ordinate represents
the probability of detecting file corruption PX . For example,
in the orange line, the probability of corruption detection is
98.4%when we challenge 50 blocks (c = 50) and the number
of corrupted file blocks is l = 80.
FIGURE 4. The probability curves Px of detecting the corruption.
B. THE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Based on the generation of the challenge-and-response inter-
action in public auditing, we give the communication cost
of the public verification. Before detailing the simulation,
we introduce the meanings of the notations: t is the threshold
value, n is the number of blocks in file F , c is the number of
challenging blocks, and | | means the length.
During the proof generation in public verification, the ver-
ifier generates a challenge message once getting the verify
request from a user. According to the received challenge
message chal = (c, k1, k2), the cloud server first generates
the proof message Pro = {{FIDι}ι∈I , µ, ϕ}. The communica-
tion overhead for transmitting the challenge message chal =
(c, k1, k2), 1 ≤ c ≤ n is 3|Zq|. After getting the challenge
message, the public verifier generates the proof message Pro
which needs the communication overhead of c|Zq| + 2|G1|.
The computation overhead of public auditing is summarized
in Table 2.
TABLE 2. The Comparison of Communication Overhead.
CDS [14] utilizes the knowledge of blockchain and the
access structure based onweighted attributes to get a convinc-
ing customized data sharing scheme. CDS also ensures the
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TABLE 3. The Comparison of Computation Overhead.
data integrity by public auditing. In the data access method of
CDS, the threshold of access is decided by the owners to real-
ize customization. However, the communication overhead is
a little high and the access method is complex, thus CDS is
not suitable for the scenario proposed in this paper.
In the comparison scheme CDS [14], the public verifier
has to select a c-element set to determine the challenged
blocks. As shown in Table 2, CDS needs the communica-
tion overhead of (c + 1)|Zq| in the transmition of challenge
message. In our proposed scheme, we choose two random
numbers k1, k2 ∈ Zq, use a pseudo-random permutation
π and a pseudo-random function f to generate identify the
challenged blocks. Therefore, we need less communication
overhead than CDS.
C. THE COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
In the computation overhead analysis, we use ExpG1 to
denote the computation time of exponentiation operation in
G1, MulZq and MulG1 to denote the computation time of
multiplication operation in Zp and G1, respectively, Hash to
denote the computation cost of a Hash operation in G1, En to
denote the computation time of an encryption, XOR to denote
the computation time of a xor operation, F1 to denote the
computation time of a pseudo-random permutation, F2 to
denote the computation time of a pseudo-random function,
and Pair to denote the computation cost of a pair operation.
As shown in Table 3, we analyze the computation over-
head from the following five aspects: signature generation,
proof generation, proof verification, encryption of access key
and decryption of access key. In Sign, the user calculates
the signature as σi = (H (FIDi) · gmi )uska ∈ G1 with the
computation overhead of Hash + MulG1 + 2ExpG1 . The
generation of proof message needs the cost of cπ + cf +
cMulZq + (c − 1)MulG1 + cExpG1 to generate the proof
message Pro = {{FIDι}ι∈I , µ, ϕ} in ProofGen. In ProofVer,
the public verifier computes ι = πk1 (j), vι = fk2 (j), 1 ≤
j ≤ c with the cost of cπ + cf and then checks the proof
by e(ϕ, g) = e(5ι∈IH (FIDι)vι · gµ, upka) with the cost of
cMulG1 + 2Pair + cHash+ (c+ 1)ExpG1 . The computation
overhead of access key encryption in ASet and decryption in
GetA areMulG1 + 2ExpG1 andMulG1 + ExpG1 respectively.
In addition to theoretical analysis in Table 3, we also
evaluate the performance from the above five parts as shown
in Fig. 5. In order to facilitate the reading, we display the over-
lapped places in Fig. 5. It’s easy to find that the cost in proof
generation and proof verification is linear with the number of
FIGURE 5. The computation cost.
the challenged blocks and that of signature, encryption and
decryption is independent of the challenged number.
In the evaluation comparison of computation overhead,
we compare the computation overhead of our scheme and
CDS in the verification and access as the difference in the
generation of signature is not significant. The comparison
results of verification in Fig. 6 clearly show that the com-
putation overhead of our scheme is a little more than that of
CDS. The reason is that we use a pseudo-random permutation
and a pseudo-random function to genearte the message of
FIGURE 6. The comparison of verification.
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challeng information. The advantages are high security and
low communication overhead. Therefore, the a little more
overhead is tolerable.
What’s more, we reduce the computaion overhead of
access in this paper with the help of ElGamal encryption.
The comparison results (see Fig. 7) clearly demonstrate that
the computation overhead of our scheme is lower than that
of CDS as it uses a mathematical method by a polynomial
p(z) = a0 + a1z + · · · + aτ−1zτ−1 which makes the cost
be linear with the value of the threshold t . Therefore, our
scheme is more efficient in access and meets the requirement
of CPSS.
FIGURE 7. The comparison of access.
VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a lightweight and secure data stor-
age and sharing scheme that supports real-time data collec-
tion, data storage, public auditing and data access, especially
for CPSS. The main contribution of the proposed scheme is
our development of an incentive based data collection by giv-
ing users the weight of accessing the user, which encourages
the user to take part in data collection and realizes the require-
ments such as real-time and reliability of CPSS. During the
integrity verification of files, the proposed scheme adopts
the pseudo-random method to protect data privacy against
the honest-but-curious verifier. In order to realize secure and
lightweight access in CPSS, we introduce ElGamal encryp-
tion to transmit the sccess key value. Extensive theoretical
analyses and experimental results show the effectiveness of
our proposed scheme.
This paper focuses on secure and efficient data storage
and access in CPSS. In order to adapt to the requirements
of CPSS, in the future work, we will focus on practical data
access control, e.g., dynamic visitor groups and fair incen-
tive mechanism. We mainly consider drawing on incentive
mechanisms in the areas of blockchain and crowd sensing,
and improving their dynamic performance.
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